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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BILL OF ATTAINDER--SEcTION 504
oF THE LANDRUM-GRIFFiN ACT HELD: UNCONSTITUTIONAL-United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
Respondent, an open member of the Communist Party, was
elected to the Executive Board of Local 10 of the International
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union in 1959, 1960, and 1961.
During his third term of office he was indicted, tried, and convicted
for violation of section 504 of the Landrum-Griffin Act.1 Con-
gress had enacted section 504, which replaced section 9 (h) of the
Taft-Hartley Act,2 to prevent political strikes and disruptions in
the economy.3 Section 9(h) had proved ineffective in removing
Communists from union office.4
1 "(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
Party ... shall serve-
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive
board or similar governing body... of any labor organization ....
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the
Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both."
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act) § 504, 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1964).
2 Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), repealed, 73 Stat. 525 (1959). Section
9 (h), upheld in American Communications Workers v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382 (1950), provided that the use of the NLRB facilities would be de-
nied to any union whose officers did not file affidavits stating that
they were not members of the Communist Party and did not believe
in or belong to any organization that advocated the illegal overthrow
of the government.
But see Communist Control Act § 6, 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C.
§ 784(a) l(E) (1958). Section 6 provides, inter alia, that once a com-
munist organization is registered it shall be unlawful for any member
to hold office with a union. It would seem likely that this provision
is unconstitutional as a bill of attainder following the present case.
3 In American Communication Workers v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 388-89
(1950), the Court found that the purpose of § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley
Act was to prevent political strikes. Section 504 was adopted as a
more effective means of accomplishing the same result. H. R. Rep.
No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 33.
4 S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1959), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, at 2351-52 (1959). The Justice Department
testified at the Senate hearings that Communists were filing false
affidavits under the Taft-Hartley Act while they secretly remained
Party members, even while non-Communist unions were being denied
certificates of compliance through mere inadvertence on the part of
their officers to file affidavits.
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The district court upheld the constitutionality of section 504,
refusing to give respondent's requested instructions requiring a
finding of specific intent for conviction.5 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Brown v. United States6 reversed, holding that sec-
tion 504 placed an impermissible restraint on the respondent's right
of association and further that there was not a sufficient relation-
ship between respondent's status as a Communist holding union
office and the evil Congress sought to eliminate to meet due process
of law requirements. Without reaching the constitutional issues de-
cided in the circuit court, five justices, in an opinion written by
the Chief Justice, affirmed, holding that section 504 is a bill of
attainder and therefore violates Article I, section 9 of the Constitu-
tion.7 The statute is the first struck down by the Court as a bill of
attainder since United States v. Lovett8 was decided in 1946.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without a judicial trial upon named individuals or those of an easily
ascertainable class.9 The present case applies this definition to a
legislative act which specifically designates Communists as in-
dividuals unfit to hold union office and punishes them by forcing
them to choose between loss of their union position and criminal
sanctions.
Section 504 is a bill of attainder because it regulates a desig-
nated political organization instead of setting forth:
a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who com-
mits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts or char-
acteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate
political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leave to courts
and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the
specified acts or possess the specified characteristics.' 0
The Court emphasized that "the Communist Party" is not a
"shorthand phrase" which designates the characteristics which Con-
gress is seeking to bar from labor unions." Therefore, section 504
5 Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 492 (9th Cir. 1964).
6 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964).
7 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
8 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
9 Id. at 315. A bill of attainder inflicts its punishment "... without the
safeguards of a judicial trial and 'determined by no previous law or
fixed rule.'" Id. at 316-17. The only function a court would perform
in invoking a bill of attainder would be to ascertain if the accused is
the one the legislature attainted, which is of course not a judicial trial
at all. The conviction has already been effected and the punishment
pronounced by the legislature.
10 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965).
11 Id. at 456. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (mere
CASENOTES
cannot be rationalized by using the designation "Communist Party"
to denote "those characteristics which render likely the incite-
ment of political strikes."'11
A bill of attainder necessarily denies the victim due process
of law. But the bill of attainder clause is in the Constitution for
the specific purpose of insuring that no one is tried and convicted
by the legislature. The importance of the guarantee would seem to
require more than a foundation on vague concepts of due process;
the protection should be based on the more specific clause. This is
the apparent reason that the Court chose to avoid the due process
issue relied on by the circuit court, as well as other constitutional
membership in the Communist Party not equivalent to advocating
forcible overthrow of the government). Legislative findings to this
effect are not sufficient since the Party would have been tried by the
legislature, which is what the bill of attainder clause proscribes.
However, if there is a certainty that the legislative findings are
correct, a constitutional statute which applies to a specific group or
specific individuals may be framed. For example, a legislature may
deny a driver's license to all who are in a class possessing a suscepti-
bility to uncontrollable seizures. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 454 n.29 (1965). If all Communist Party members do in fact pos-
sess characteristics which are dangerous if coupled with union power
(at least to the extent that no court may prospectively separate one
member from another in this respect), there is no adjudicating to be
done. The majority of course does not believe this to be the case.
Another type of specification was held constitutional in Hawker
v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898), in which a convicted abortionist
was tried under a statute which barred felons from practicing medi-
cine. The statute was held constitutional since the abortionist had
been tried and convicted-a sufficient judicial determination on which
the legislature may act to preserve the integrity of the medical pro-
fession. Section 504 does not fit under this classification since the
Communist Party has not received a conviction applicable here. The
dissent argues that the administrative finding that the Communist
Party is an organization advocating the forceful overthrow of the
government by the Subversive Activities Control Board approved in
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1(1961), should serve in the present case as an adequate basis on which
Congress may act. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 471 (1965).
But in the majority's view the Court in the Communist Party case
was acting only in regard to a broad definition, the "communist-action
organization" of § 3 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,
64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. § 781-826 (1964). The definition in § 3 permits
the Party to escape the punishment prescribed in the event its char-
acter changes, but § 504 does not. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 452 n.26 (1965).
12 Id. at 456 n.31. The circuit court used the same argument to justify
its conclusion that respondent was denied due process of law. Brown
v. United States, 334 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1964).
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grounds such as freedom of association.13
But in invoking the bill of attainder clause the Court is con-
fronted with a parallel to section 504 in a conflict-of-interest
statute, section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933,14 which provides that
no employee of an organization dealing in securities may concur-
rently serve as an employee of a member bank of the Federal Re-
serve system. The dissent argued that since section 32 is not a bill
of attainder, section 504 should be upheld.15 Section 32 is closely
analogous to section 504, but is distinguished by the Court on three
grounds.16  The first is that section 504 pertains to a political
group and section 32 does not. This is significant since political
groups were the targets of the majority of the early English and
American bills of attainder.17 The second is that "§ 32 incorporates
no judgment censuring or condemning any man or group of men."'8
However, as stated by the dissent, both provisions deal with a "spe-
cifically described group, officers and employees of underwriting
firms in the one case and members of the Communist Party in the
other."' 9 The third distinction made is that section 32 is a general
rule while section 504 is a specification. But both statutes ban the
retention of two types of positions concurrently and both name the
specific group banned-Communists in one case and those in under-
writing houses in the other. The distinction is not convincing.
Since the political-non-political dichotomy appears to be the most
persuasive distinction given by the Court, future bill of attainder
cases may well turn on whether the accused is a member of a politi-
cal group.
Infliction of punishment is a necessary element of a bill of at-
tainder. The present case substantially broadens the meaning of
"punishment" and thereby the scope of the bill of attainder clause.
13 There is every implication that the Court approves of the circuit court's
holding. The Court uses the lower court's reasoning to buttress their
own bill of attainder argument ("overbroadness" is discussed in the
opinion to strengthen the argument that "Communist Party" is not a
shorthand phrase used to designate certain characteristics to be kept
out of the labor movement). United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456
n.31 (1965).
14 48 Stat. 194 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
15 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 466-67 (1965) (dissenting
opinion).
16 Id. at 453-55.
17 Id. at 453. Compare United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947). (Section 9A of the Hatch Act, prohibiting federal employees
from engaging in political activity, held not a bill of attainder).
18 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 453-54 (1965).
19 Id. at 466 (dissenting opinion).
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The view that only limited forms of punishment are proscribed by
the bill of attainder clause has restricted its application in several
cases in spite of Cummings v. Missouri2" which held that a depriva-
tion of the right to follow one's profession constitutes punishment.
In a narrow interpretation of the present case loss of one's job
constitutes punishment, but under a broader reading, the case may
mean that any form of retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, or
prevention is punishment under the bill of attainder clause.
The present case destroys a limitation on the meaning of pun-
ishment stated in American Communication Workers v. Douds22--
that a statute which only punishes for future actions is not a bill of
attainder. The provision at issue in Douds, section 9 (h) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, escaped the bill of attainder proscription since it
operated preventively and prospectively by punishing only when
non-Communist affidavits were not filed. Douds was distinguished
from Cummings, Ex parte Garland,23 and Lovett on this basis since
the bill of attainder in those cases punished for past acts or beliefs.
The present case actually affirms the doctrine of early English cases
which held that the punishment imposed by a bill of attainder may
be for prospective as well as past conduct.20 4
Since a statute is a bill of attainder if punishment is inflicted
on a specific group of individuals for prospective as well as past
acts, the constitutionality of many types of loyalty oaths is in doubt.
Several cases have not applied the bill of attainder proscription to
loyalty oaths as conditions of government employment because the
oath referred only to future and prospective qualifications. 25
20 71 U.s. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
21 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
22 339 U.S. 382 (1950). The same principle was stated in Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 86-87 (1961).
23 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). In Garland an act requiring attorneys
to swear that they had not taken part in the rebellion against the
Union before they could practice in the federal courts was held uncon-
stitutional as a bill of attainder.
24 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965); 72 YALE L.J. 330,
337 (1962).
25 Garner v. Board of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716, 722-23 (1951). The
non-Communist oath in this case set prospective standards of qualifi-
cation for city employees according to the majority. They reasoned
that no punishment was involved since only general and prospective
qualifications were imposed whereas in Lovett the determining qual-
ifications were for past beliefs. The same bar to bill of attainder was
used in Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wash.2d 460, 335 P.2d 10 (1959) and
Thorp v. Trustees of Schools for Industrial Educ., 6 N.J. 498, 79 A.2d
462 (1951). The majority in Garner also seems to say that the oath
was "reasonable" as a qualification for employment, but this is not a
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With this distinction disappearing, loyalty oaths could increasingly
be held to be bills of attainder.
Douds also maintained that section 9(h) was not a bill of at-
tainder since there was an avenue of escape from the punishment
through a change in political loyalty. The present case rejects this
doctrine as historically inaccurate and contrary to precedent.26
Forcing an individual to change his political beliefs under the
threat of loss of office is obviously a punishment which only an
unjustifiably narrow interpretation of the term could exclude.
Besides the changes in the interpretation of what constitutes
punishment under the bill of attainder clause, the emphasis in the
present case upon the nature of the class designated is a departure
from previous bill of attainder cases.27 Previously the central in-
quiry in these cases had been whether the punishment was imposed
by the legislature to reach the person or class with an intent to
punish or whether the punishment was merely incidental to what
otherwise would be valid legislation.2  The presence of an intent to
punish was ascertained either by determining the motives of Con-
gress in passing the act, as was done in United States v. Lovett,29 or
by a finding that "the characteristic causing persons to be dis-
valid test of bill of attainder since the clause bans all punishment of
specific persons without judicial trial regardless of the reasonableness
involved.
26 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 457 n.32 (1965). Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), is cited as supporting this prop-
osition as well as several ante-constitution bills of attainder which
" . . inflicted their deprivations upon named or described persons or
groups, but offered them the option of avoiding the deprivations, e.g.,
by swearing allegiance to the existing government."
27 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
28 DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (plurality opinion); Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866). And in Flem-
ming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), a bill of attainder challenge was
not sustained because the statute did not punish but rather regulated
an activity, the Social Security system, and punitive intent was not
shown. The statute terminated Social Security payments when the
alien defendants were deported for being members of the Communist
Party. Even though the defendants had paid into the fund the Court
reasoned that ". . . no affirmative disability or restraint is imposed, and
certainly nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment' of impris-
onment .... ." is present. Id. at 617. Brown discredits this aspect of
Flemming since the presence of congressional punitive intent is not
controlling-the only requirement to establish punishment within the
meaning of bill of attainder is that the effect of the act is to punish.
29 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946). (An act which
manifested congressional intent to punish named individuals, thought
by a House committee to be subversive, held unconstitutional as a bill
of attainder).
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qualified was irrelevant to the activity from which they were ex-
cluded."'3 0 In the present case the Court implies that imposition of
punishment on specific individuals constitutes a bill of attainder
without regard to any alleged legislative intent to punish.
Disregard of this legislative intent together with the broadened
interpretation of punishment has been termed a "functional test"
since the effect of the statute determines whether the act is a
bill of attainder.31 The effect and function of section 504 is to pun-
ish specific individuals by depriving them of their union positions;
it is therefore unconstitutional. It is apparent that statutes re-
stricting allegedly subversive individuals and organizations will
have to be carefully framed to avoid a bill of attainder challenge
under the Brown interpretation.
Mark F. Anderson '67
30 64 YALE L.J. 712, 723 (1955). This test was used in Cummings V.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), in which a provision of the
Missouri Constitution of 1865 provided that no one could engage in the
ministry unless he took an expurgatory oath saying he had not taken
part in the rebellion against the Union. Since no relevancy could be
found between fitness for the profession and the oath taken, penal
intent was inferred and the provision was declared a bill of attainder.
31 See 72 YALE L.J. 330, 331 (1962).
